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LOOKING AHEAD: THE FUTURE OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
*

SUSAN LOW BLOCH

1

Fifty years after Brown v. Board of Education, race is still a serious
issue in this country. Fortunately, we no longer debate whether it is
legal for the government to operate segregated schools or to treat
blacks as second-class citizens. We finally answered that question
correctly—it is unconstitutional for the law to segregate and to treat
2
blacks worse than whites.
Today, we face the more difficult question of ascertaining the
constitutionality of “affirmative action” or “benign discrimination”
3
programs. The Supreme Court first addressed this issue in 1978 in
*
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I want to thank the
Georgetown University Law Center and our Dean, Judy Areen, for their generous
Writer’s Grants, as well as my Research Assistants Angela Butcher, Aliza Diamond,
and Matt Wechsler for their helpful assistance.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. See, e.g., id. (holding that segregation in public schools is a violation of the
equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment); Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in the District of Columbia’s
public schools is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass’n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (vacating
a judgment requiring segregated facilities at state parks and remanding for
reconsideration in light of the Brown decision); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903
(1956) (affirming the judgment of the district court, which held that statutes and
ordinances requiring segregation on buses violated both due process and equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment); Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dirs., 353 U.S.
230 (1957) (holding that the refusal by a state agency, acting as trustee, to admit
black students to a college created by a private trust violated the Fourteenth
Amendment); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (striking down an attempt by
Arkansas to delay the desegregation of public schools as mandated by Brown).
3. The term “affirmative action” was first used by President John F. Kennedy
when he created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 1961. The
phrase, as used by Kennedy, simply required that projects receiving federal funds
take “affirmative action” to ensure that employment decisions are free from racial
discrimination. See Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 6, 1961). Slowly,
the idea of affirmative action evolved to encompass programs that actively sought to
increase the participation of racial minorities. For example, in 1965, pursuant to the
authorization of Executive Order No. 11246, the Department of Labor established
the Office of Federal Contract Compliance, which required contractors to
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4

the landmark case Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. In a
confusing set of six opinions, four Justices concluded that the
5
program was constitutional, while four others held that it violated
6
federal law. Justice Powell alone stated that the consideration of race
7
was not necessarily unconstitutional, but that the use of quotas was.
As a result, with Justice Powell’s vote controlling, there were five
Justices who said race could be considered in school admissions, but
8
also five Justices who struck down the particular program at issue.
demonstrate proactive plans to ensure the inclusion of minorities in their workforce
before government contracts would be awarded. Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed.
Reg. 12319 (Sept. 28, 1965). In 1970, the Labor Department required employers
with fifty or more employees and $50,000 in government business to develop
“specific goals and timetables” to correct for the underutilization of minority
workers. For a history of these efforts, see ALBERT G. MOSLEY & NICHOLAS CAPALDI,
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: SOCIAL JUSTICE OR UNFAIR PREFERENCE (1996).
4. See 438 U.S. 265, 281 (1978) (challenging the admission policy of reserving
sixteen of its 100 seats for minority students at the University of California at Davis’s
Medical School). Prior to Bakke, the Court seemed to let the issue percolate among
the lower courts. See, e.g., Johnson v. Comm. on Examinations, 407 U.S. 915 (1972)
(per curiam) (denying certiorari for a case challenging the Arizona State Bar’s
reconsideration and admission of failing minority applicants to the bar while denying
admission to white applicants with higher scores). Even if the Court heard such a
case, it often dismissed it without a decision on the merits. For example, in DeFunis
v. Odegaard the Supreme Court granted certiorari but then dismissed as moot a case
challenging the constitutionality of the University of Washington Law School’s
admissions program on the grounds that it favored minority applicants. 416 U.S. 312
(1974). The case was dismissed as moot because, by the date of oral argument, the
plaintiff was in his final quarter of law school, having been admitted pursuant to a
court order, and the school conceded that he would be permitted to finish that
quarter regardless of the Court’s ruling. Id. at 317.
5. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 325-26 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (concluding that race may be used as a factor in admissions decisions and
that overcoming substantial chronic minority under-representation in the medical
profession is an acceptable justification for such preferences). Justices Marshall,
White and Blackmun joined in this opinion. Id.
6. See id. at 411-12, 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(stating that it was not necessary to decide, in this case, whether race could ever
constitutionally be a factor in admissions decisions because the admissions policy at
issue violated federal anti-discrimination law). Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart and Rehnquist joined in this opinion. Id.
7. Id. at 319-20.
8. Justice Powell announced the opinion of the court with the following
introduction:
For the reasons stated in the following opinion, I believe that so much of the
judgment of the California court as holds petitioner’s special admissions
program unlawful and directs that respondent to be admitted to the Medical
School must be affirmed. For the reasons expressed in a separate opinion,
my Brothers the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, and
Mr. Justice Stevens concur in this judgment.
I also conclude for the reasons stated in the following opinion that the
portions of the court’s judgment enjoining petitioner from according any
consideration to race in its admissions process must be reversed. For reasons
expressed in separate opinions, my Brothers Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice
White, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice Blackmun concur in this
judgment.
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For the next seventeen years, the Court debated the appropriate
standard by which to assess the constitutionality of these affirmative
9
action programs. Finally, in 1995, the Court held in Adarand
10
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, a five-to-four decision, that strict scrutiny
was the appropriate standard for all governmental programs based on
11
race, including those designed to help underrepresented minorities.
Under strict scrutiny, those defending a program against an equal
protection challenge must show that the program is narrowly tailored
12
to serve a compelling governmental interest.
Until 2003, the Court did not have an opportunity to define strict
13
scrutiny in the context of affirmative action. Would it be as strict as
the scrutiny utilized to judge programs that disadvantage minorities,
so that, in the words of the late Gerald Gunther, it would be “strict in
14
theory but fatal in fact?” Or would the standard applied to these
“benign discrimination” programs be less strict?
In Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence in Adarand, she specifically noted that in
the context of affirmative action, strict scrutiny would not necessarily
be fatal:
[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is “strict in
theory, but fatal in fact.” The unhappy persistence of both the
practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against
minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and
15
government is not disqualified from acting in response to it.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Id. at 271.
9. The Court held in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. that affirmative action
programs adopted by state and local governments should be judged by a strict
scrutiny standard. 488 U.S. 469, 490-91 (1989). However, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC, the Court distinguished federal programs from state and local programs and
held that federal programs should be judged according to the more lenient standard
of intermediate scrutiny. 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990).
10. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
11. Id. at 227.
12. Id. In Adarand, the Court overruled the aspect of Metro Broadcasting that
distinguished between federal and state programs, and held that all government
programs, including those adopted by the federal government, should be judged by
strict scrutiny. Id.
13. The Adarand case went up and down the federal judiciary several times,
receiving Supreme Court scrutiny twice more, but the Court never reached the issue
on the merits. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216 (2000)
(reversing the Tenth Circuit’s decision that Adarand’s appeal was moot and
remanding the case for consideration on the merits); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001) (dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted).
14. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972) (internal quotations omitted).
15. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (internal citation omitted).
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Finally in 2003, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to tell us
more in the cases challenging the University of Michigan’s affirmative
16
action programs. But before discussing the Michigan cases, I will set
the stage by giving the views of the man who brought us Brown v.
Board of Education, Thurgood Marshall.
Justice Marshall started with the premise that the ultimate goal for
17
our country is to be a “colorblind” society in which race is irrelevant.
However, Marshall pointed out that this commonly accepted goal has
led to two very different conclusions. Some people conclude that,
because what is ultimately desired is a colorblind society, raceconscious remedies should not and cannot be used to eliminate the
18
Others, however, believe that the
effects of past discrimination.
vestiges of racial bias in America are, in Marshall’s words, “so
pernicious and difficult to remove that we must take advantage of all
19
the remedial measures at our disposal.” Which of these conclusions
one adopts, said Marshall, depends on how close one believes this
20
country is to the desired colorblind society.
21
In Marshall’s view, “we still have a very long way to go.”
Therefore, he believed that every possible remedial measure should
be considered. In a speech at the Judicial Conference of the Second
Circuit in 1986, Marshall urged Americans to:
[F]ace the simple fact that there are groups in every community
which are daily paying the cost of the history of American injustice.
The argument against affirmative action is . . . an argument in favor
of leaving that cost to lie where it falls. Our fundamental sense of
fairness, particularly as it is embodied in the guarantee of equal
protection under the law, requires us to make an effort to see that
those costs are shared equitably while we continue to work for the
eradication of the consequences of discrimination. Otherwise, we
must admit to ourselves that so long as the lingering effects of
inequality are with us, the burden will be borne by those who are
22
least able to pay.

Significantly, the Justice who now sits in Marshall’s Supreme Court
seat, Clarence Thomas, could not disagree more. While not
addressing Marshall’s question of how far our society has come in its
16. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct.
2411 (2003).
17. Annual Judicial Conference Second Judicial Circuit of the United States, 115
F.R.D. 349, 351 (1986).
18. Id. at 351-52 (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 352-53.
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quest for colorblindness, Thomas believes that all racial
classifications, no matter how generous their motivation, are
unconstitutional. In his separate concurrence in Adarand, Thomas
argued that there is a “moral and constitutional equivalence between
laws designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits
on the basis of race in order to foster some notion of equality.
Government cannot make us equal; it can only recognize, respect, and
23
protect us as equal before the law.”
In Thomas’ view, the
government cannot make distinctions on the basis of race, no matter
how benign the motivation. He believes that affirmative action
programs embody and foster a paternalism that is at war with the
principle of equality and that can be “just as poisonous and
24
pernicious as any other form of discrimination.” Thomas concluded
his separate Adarand concurrence with vehemence: “Governmentsponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as
noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice. In each
25
instance, it is racial discrimination, plain and simple.”
This was the scene when the affirmative action cases from the
University of Michigan arrived, presenting the Court with its first
opportunity to address the constitutionality of affirmative action
programs in higher education since Bakke, as well as the first
opportunity to apply the strict scrutiny test mandated by Adarand.
There were in fact two different University of Michigan programs
under attack: Grutter v. Bollinger challenged the law school’s
26
admissions program, and Gratz v. Bollinger challenged the
27
The University
undergraduate school’s admissions program.
23. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (J. Thomas, concurring in part and in the
judgment) (emphasis added).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 241.
26. 123 S. Ct. 2325. See also Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich.
2001) (ruling in favor of petitioners and holding that the law school’s consideration
of race and ethnicity in its admissions decisions violated both the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and federal anti-discrimination statutory law
because the goal of achieving student diversity was not a compelling governmental
interest and that, in any event, the law school’s policy was not narrowly tailored to
further such an objective), rev’d, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding the law
school’s admission policy valid because it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
interest in achieving a diverse student body).
27. 123 S. Ct. 2411. After Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher filed their suit
against Lee Bollinger for alleged discrimination in the undergraduate admissions
program and the University sought to justify its program as an effort to obtain a
diverse student body, the district court denied the motion of a group of prospective
minority applicants who sought to intervene in order to justify the program as one to
remedy past discrimination. Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
The court denied the motion because proposed intervenors lacked a substantial legal
interest in the suit and failed to show inadequate representation by the University.
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defended both programs by arguing that they were designed to
achieve a diverse student body comprised of students from a wide

Id. On consolidated appeal with the law school case, the Sixth Circuit reversed and
remanded to the district court, holding that the proposed intervenors: (1) had a
sufficient substantial legal interest to support intervention as of right; (2) had made
sufficient showing that impairment of their substantial legal interest was possible if
intervention was denied; and (3) had established the possibility that the University
would not adequately represent their interest in the underlying actions. Grutter v.
Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 398-401 (6th Cir. 1999).
After this preliminary skirmishing, both parties moved for summary judgment.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 826 (E.D. Mich. 2000). The District Court
held that the University could consider race as a factor in student selection in order
to further the objective of obtaining diversity in the student body. Id. at 826. While
the University’s past practice, used from 1995-1998, of reserving some seats for
minorities and using separate scoring grids for white and minority applicants was an
unconstitutional quota and violated the equal protection rights of the white
applicants, its revised program that began in 1999 was sufficiently narrowly tailored
to be constitutional. Id. at 827-28. Thus, the Court granted plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment with respect to the admissions programs in existence from 1995
through 1998, and granted University-defendants’ motion for summary judgment
with respect to the admissions programs for 1999 and 2000. Id. at 831-33.
Thereafter, in Gratz v. Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D. Mich. 2001), the court
considered defendant-intervenors’ argument that the admissions programs passed
constitutional muster as a narrowly tailored means of remedying past and current
discrimination by the University. Although the University-defendants never claimed
that the admissions programs were implemented to remedy past discrimination, the
Sixth Circuit, in allowing defendant-intervenors to join this action, found it
persuasive “that the University is unlikely to present evidence of past discrimination
by the University itself or of the disparate impact of some current admissions criteria,
and that these may be important and relevant factors in determining the legality of a
race-conscious admissions policy.” Id. at 794 (internal quotations omitted). The
District Court interpreted this statement to require that the defendant-intervenors be
given the opportunity to prove that remedying discrimination was the “actual”
purpose behind the admissions programs. Id. at 795. The District Court then found
that the defendant-intervenors failed to present sufficient evidence to create a
genuine issue of material fact in support of their claim and granted summary
judgment to the plaintiffs. Id. at 802.
The Sixth Circuit consolidated the appeals for both the law school and the
undergraduate cases involving both the original defendants and the intervening
defendants and held a hearing en banc on December 6, 2001. Gratz v. Bollinger, 277
F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 2001). On May 14, 2002, the Sixth Circuit issued an opinion in
the law school case, Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, but never issued a decision on
the merits in Gratz. On December 2, 2002, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
the law school case as well as the undergraduate case. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct.
602 (2002). The Court heard arguments in both cases on April 1, 2003 and decided
both on June 23, 2003.
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28

variety of social, ethnic, and racial backgrounds. The opponents
29
argued that this was not a compelling interest.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice O’Connor, made the very
significant decision that the University’s desire to achieve diversity in
its student body was in fact a compelling governmental interest,
relying heavily on the reasoning of Justice Powell’s lone opinion in
30
Bakke. The Court then went on to find, in a five-to-four decision,
that the law school’s nuanced, holistic consideration of race was
31
sufficiently narrowly tailored to be constitutional. The Court noted
that “narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every
conceivable race-neutral alternative. Nor does it require a university
to choose between maintaining a reputation for excellence and
fulfilling a commitment to provide educational opportunities to
32
members of all racial groups.”
The Court rejected the Bush
Administration’s argument that the law school’s desire to achieve a
33
“critical mass” of minority students was “a disguised quota.” Thus,
28. See Brief for Respondents at 2, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (No. 02-0241)
(“The Law School has determined that effective pursuit of its mission
requires . . . integrated classes comprising a mix of students with varying
backgrounds and experiences . . . , each of whom is among the most capable
students applying to American law schools in a given year.”) (internal quotations
omitted); Brief for Respondents at 2, Gratz, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (No. 02-516)
(“The University considers a broadly diverse student body an integral component of
its mission because such diversity increases the intellectual vitality of its education,
scholarship, service, and communal life.”) (internal quotations omitted).
29. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2333.
30. Id. at 2337. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether Justice
Powell’s opinion was binding under the rationale of Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188, 193-94 (1977), noting that the Marks inquiry had “baffled and divided the lower
courts that have considered it,” and that the majority here independently concluded
that diversity was in fact a compelling governmental interest. 123 S. Ct. at 2337
(internal citations omitted).
31. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2342 (recognizing that the law school’s plan does not
operate as a quota).
32. Id. at 2344. In the opinions of Justices Scalia and Thomas, writing in dissent,
the University should be forced to choose between being committed to excellence
and seeking a diverse student body. Infra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
33. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2343. The amicus brief filed by the United States
included the following argument:
Not only does the Equal Protection Clause require the government to
consider and employ efficacious race-neutral alternatives, but it also
demands that any use of race be otherwise carefully calibrated and narrowly
tailored. Efforts to use quotas to achieve predetermined levels of racial
participation are the very antithesis of such narrow tailoring. However,
respondents’ admissions policy uses disguised quotas to ensure that each
entering class includes a predetermined “critical mass” of certain racial
minorities.
This Court has repeatedly condemned quotas as
unconstitutional, and respondents cannot escape the reach of those cases by
pursuing a purportedly flexible, slightly amorphous “critical mass” in lieu of
the kind of rigid numerical quotas struck down by the Court in Bakke. In
practice, respondents’ pursuit of a “critical mass” operates no differently
than more rigid quotas. Any variations in results from year to year owe more
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34

the Court concluded that the law school program is constitutional.
Voting with Justice O’Connor were Justices Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer,
35
and Stevens. Dissenting were Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
36
Thomas, Kennedy, and Scalia.
However, in the undergraduate case, the Court decided six to
three, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, that the
37
undergraduate system was not sufficiently narrowly tailored. The
Court objected to the point system, which, on a scale of between one
to 150 points, gave twenty points to an applicant if he or she was a
member of an underrepresented race—specifically African American,
Hispanic, or Native American—and automatically admitted anyone
38
with 100 or more points. The problem with the point system, in the
view of the six in the majority, was that it was not narrowly tailored—it
was too formulaic and failed to make the individualized assessments
39
the law school made. The six in the majority were Chief Justice
to respondents’ inability to predict acceptance rates and total admissions
with unfailing accuracy than to any inherent flexibility in the quotas.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11-12, Grutter,
123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (No. 02-516).
34. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347.
35. Id. at 2330.
36. Id. at 2330-31.
37. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2430 (2003).
38. Under the Michigan undergraduate admissions program, an applicant can
score a maximum of 150 points. Id. at 2419. Each application receives points based
on high school grade point average, standardized test scores, the academic quality of
an applicant’s high school, the strength or weakness of an applicant’s high school
curriculum, in-state residency, alumni relationship, a personal essay, and personal
achievement or leadership. Id. A maximum of 110 points can be assigned for
academic performance, while other, nonacademic factors can merit up to forty
points. Id. at 2431 (O’Connor, J., concurring). For example, Michigan residents
receive ten points, and children of alumni receive four points. Id. Admissions
counselors can assign up to three points for an outstanding essay and up to five
points for an applicant’s leadership, personal achievement, or public service. Id. An
automatic twenty-point bonus is awarded to an applicant if he or she possesses any
one of the following factors: membership in an underrepresented minority group;
attendance at a predominantly minority or disadvantaged high school; or
recruitment for athletics. Id. at 2431-32. However, only one such twenty-point bonus
may be given per applicant. Id. An application decision will be based upon the
resulting number: an applicant with a score of 100 to 150 will generally be admitted
to the university; an applicant with ninety to ninety-nine points will either be
admitted or a decision will be postponed; a decision for an applicant with seventy-five
to eighty-nine points will either be delayed pending additional information or
postponed, and an applicant with fewer than seventy-five points will either be
rejected or the decision will be delayed pending additional information. Id. at 2419.
39. See id. at 2427-28
We find that the University’s policy, which automatically distributes 20
points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every
single ‘underrepresented minority’ applicant solely because of race, is not
narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational diversity that
respondents claim justifies their program.
Id.
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Rehnquist, Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, O’Connor, and
40
41
Breyer. Dissenting were Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens. In
light of this result, the University has revised its undergraduate
program to make it a more individualized assessment—not an easy
task given that it receives more than 25,000 applications for 5,000
42
spots.
I was not surprised by the decision. In fact, I had predicted it. I
said at this Symposium in March 2003, I thought that Justice
O’Connor would want to find one of the two programs constitutional.
As noted, Justice O’Connor had said earlier in Adarand that strict
scrutiny, applied to affirmative action programs, need not necessarily
43
be fatal. The Michigan cases gave her a chance to find one that
could survive. Of the two programs, the law school program was the
better crafted—after all, it was designed by law professors who were
well aware of Supreme Court precedent. I did wonder if the Court
might find that the idea of “critical mass” was too close to a quota,
but, as noted, it did not. And I wondered if the lack of a termination
date would be a problem. But Justice O’Connor simply introduced
her own idea that she expected that these programs will no longer be
44
necessary in twenty-five years. As she expressed it:
We take the Law School at its word that it would “like nothing
better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula” and will
terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as
practicable. It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved
the use of race to further an interest in student body diversity in
the context of higher education. Since that time, the number of
40. Justice Breyer only concurred in the judgment and did not join the majority
opinion. Id. at 2433.
41. Id. at 2434.
42. In an interview with University of Michigan President Mary Sue Coleman,
CNN Anchor Judy Woodroof asked Coleman what effect she thought the Supreme
Court’s ruling would have on Michigan’s undergraduate admissions policy. Coleman
responded:
Well, what we may do is to fashion our undergraduate policy along the lines
of the law school policy, which the Court said is fine and said that the law
school policy is constitutional. And what that means is, it’s a more
individualized attention to every single application . . . . [W]e believe that we
can do this in a way that the Court has found constitutional. And our other
policy, the earlier one that the Court struck down, was a screening device,
because we get so many applications. So what we may have to do is to have
more admissions counselors, hire more people for the undergraduate
admissions, do more intensive work . . . . And I want to let students know
that now we’ll be looking, using a slightly different policy, but we’re going to
give every application a fair look.
Michigan President Happy with Rulings, CNN ACCESS, June 23, 2003, available at
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/LAW/06/23/cnna.coleman/.
43. See supra text accompanying note 15.
44. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003).
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minority applicants with high grades and test scores has indeed
increased. We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest
45
approved today.

One of the striking features of these two Michigan cases is that they
generated a total of thirteen opinions—six opinions in the law school
case and seven in the undergraduate case. Each of the nine justices
wrote his or her own opinion in at least one of the cases. It was
almost like the early days of seriatim opinions from the high Court.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the principal dissenting opinion in
the law school case, joined by all the dissenters—Justices Kennedy,
46
Scalia, and Thomas.
He accused the majority of improperly
applying the strict scrutiny test and showing too much deference to
the University’s decisions: “Although the Court recites the language
of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that review is
47
unprecedented in its deference.” Justice Kennedy agreed, calling
48
the law school’s use of “critical mass” a disguised quota.
Justice Thomas wrote an impassioned dissent in the law school
49
case, in which Justice Scalia joined. His opinion was thirty-one pages
long, almost as long as Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion. After
quoting Frederick Douglass and accusing the majority of responding
50
to “a faddish slogan of the cognoscenti” in order to achieve what he
51
derisively called “racial aesthetics,” Thomas concluded that
Michigan has shown “no compelling interest in having a law school at
52
all, much less an elite one.” Thomas opined that, because many
graduates leave the state, the “Law School’s decision to be an elite
institution does little to advance the welfare of the people of
53
Michigan or any cognizable interest of the State of Michigan.”
Thomas thereby dismissed the judgment of the state’s elected
officials over all these years. He also rejected racial preferences as
54
55
destructive and stigmatizing.
In his view, such preferences are
45. Id. at 2346-47 (internal citations omitted).
46. Id. at 2366 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The dissenting opinion by the Chief
Justice, which I join in full, demonstrates beyond question why the concept of critical
mass is a delusion used by the Law School to mask its attempt to make race an
automatic factor in most instances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable
from quotas.”).
49. Id. at 2350 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2357.
52. Id. at 2353.
53. Id. at 2355.
54. See id. at 2352 (“‘Purchased at the price of immeasurable human suffering,
the equal protection principle reflects our Nation’s understanding that such
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unconstitutional now and will still be unconstitutional in twenty-five
56
years. In fact, he put his own “spin” on Justice O’Connor’s twentyfive-year statement, saying that the majority was giving universities a
57
“25-year license to violate the Constitution” and that he “agree[d]
with the Court’s holding that racial discrimination in higher
58
education will be illegal in 25 years,” not exactly what the Court said,
59
as Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her concurrence.
Justice Scalia also wrote his own dissent in the law school case, in
which Justice Thomas joined. He agreed with Justice Thomas that
Michigan did not have a compelling interest in using racial
preferences to seek diversity. In his view, if Michigan would simply
stop being an elite institution that emphasized grades and high
60
LSATs, it could have a more diverse class without preferences.
Scalia also predicted that these two cases would generate
considerable future litigation, with the courts asked to decide
whether a particular program was more like the constitutionally
acceptable law school program or like the unconstitutional
61
undergraduate program.
Justice Ginsburg wrote both a concurring opinion in the law school
case and a dissent in the undergraduate case. In the law school case,
her concurrence, joined by Justice Breyer, clarified the fact that, in
her view, Justice O’Connor’s proposed twenty-five year sunset idea

classifications ultimately have a destructive impact on the individual and our
society.’”) (quoting Adarand Construction, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)).
55. Id. at 2262
When blacks take positions in the highest places of government, industry, or
academia, it is an open question today whether their skin color played a part
in their advancement. The question itself is the stigma—because either
racial discrimination did play a role, in which case the person may be
deemed ‘otherwise unqualified,’ or it did not, in which case asking the
question itself unfairly marks those blacks who would succeed without
discrimination.
Id.
56. Id. at 2361.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2364.
59. Id. At 2348 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 2348-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I find particularly unanswerable [Justice Thomas’s] central point: that the
allegedly ‘compelling state interest’ at issue here is not the incremental
‘educational benefit’ that emanates from the fabled ‘critical mass’ of
minority students, but rather Michigan’s interest in maintaining a ‘prestige’
law school whose normal admissions standards disproportionately exclude
blacks and other minorities. If that is a compelling state interest, everything
is.
Id.
61. Id. at 2349-50.
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was based on a “hope, but not [a firm] forecast,” that such
preferences will no longer be needed in twenty-five years. In Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent in the undergraduate case, in which she was joined
by Justice Souter, she said she would have upheld the number-based
program because it was open and honest, a system she preferred over
63
one operated with “winks, nods, and disguises.”
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, would have found that the
named plaintiffs in the undergraduate case had no standing to
64
challenge the undergraduate program.
Obviously, the majority
65
disagreed and reached the merits.
The Michigan cases are significant for several reasons. First, they
will affect all public higher education in the country. Second,
because of federal statutes, they will also impact all private institutions
66
that receive federal funding.
Third, they will affect the military
62. Id. at 2348 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
63. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2446 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
64. Justice Stevens argued that neither of the two named petitioners had
standing in this suit. After being denied admission to the Undergraduate School of
the University of Michigan, both Gratz and Hamacher enrolled in, and have since
graduated from, other universities. Id. at 2434. Stevens agreed the plaintiffs could
receive damages for having been denied admission under the now discarded
admissions program, but said they did not have standing to seek injunctive relief
against the current program. Id. In his complaint, Hamacher alleged that he
intended to apply to transfer to the University of Michigan if and when the
discriminatory admissions program was eliminated. Id. But Hamacher never did
apply so Stevens concluded that his claim of future injury was at best “conjectural or
hypothetical” rather than “real and immediate.” Id. at 2436. Moreover, Stevens said
there was no evidence about how the transfer program worked and how it compared
to the freshman admissions program. Id.
65. The majority rejected Justice Stevens’ contention that, because Hamacher
did not actually apply for admission as a transfer student, his future injury claim was
conjectural or hypothetical rather than real and immediate. Id. at 2423. The
majority said that the “injury in fact” necessary to establish standing in this type of
case is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the obstacle, not the ultimate
inability to obtain the benefit. Id. In such a case, the majority indicated that to
establish standing, a party need only demonstrate that he or she is able and ready to
perform and that a discriminatory policy prevents him or her from doing so on an
equal basis. Id. Because Hamacher demonstrated that he was “able and ready” to
apply as a transfer student should the University cease to use race in undergraduate
admissions, he therefore had standing to seek prospective relief with respect to the
University’s continued use of race in undergraduate admissions. Id.
The majority also rejected Justice Stevens’ contention that use of race in
undergraduate transfer admissions differed from the University’s use of race in
undergraduate freshman admissions and that Hamacher lacked standing to represent
absent class members challenging the latter. Id. It noted that the criteria used to
determine whether a transfer applicant will contribute to diversity are identical to
those used to evaluate freshman applicants. Id. at 2424-25. Because of this,
Hamacher’s personal involvement in the case, in light of both his past injury and the
potential injury that still existed at the time of class certification, led the Court to
conclude that he could maintain the action. Id. at 2426.
66. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis
of race, color, or national origin in programs and activities that receive federal
financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). Because most private universities
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67

academies. Fourth, the decision will affect private corporations that
68
Indeed, Justice O’Connor’s majority
want a diverse workforce.
opinion in Grutter was notable in its reliance on and quotations from
the many amicus briefs filed in the case, especially those from the
69
Fortune 500 companies and the retired military officials.
Finally, in addition to influencing all the admission policies of all
institutions of higher education, the decisions are likely to have a
significant impact on the appointment of any new Justice to the
Supreme Court. Determining a nominee’s views on affirmative
action will now be at least as important as ascertaining his or her
views on abortion. The appointment process will be particularly
intense if the vacancy is Justice O’Connor’s seat, because she has
been the key vote on both the affirmative action and the abortion
cases.
Fifty years after Brown v. Board of Education, our country is still
struggling to deal with the aftermath of years of slavery and
segregation. Fortunately, in 2003, the Supreme Court in the
Michigan cases has approved the constitutionality of some
enlightened methods devised to diversify higher education and to
mitigate the ill effects generated by years of racial discrimination.
How long the country can continue to utilize such methods will likely
receive federal financial aid, they are subject to the terms of Title VI.
As Justice O’Connor specifically noted in her majority opinion in Grutter, not only
did the law school program satisfy the Equal Protection Clause challenge, it also
survived the challenges under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1965 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, because the prohibitions in both of these statutes are co-extensive with the
Equal Protection Clause. 123 S. Ct. at 2347. Conversely, in the undergraduate case,
the Court held that because the program violated the Equal Protection Clause, it also
violated Title VI and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2430.
67. The Court was clearly impressed by the amicus brief of many former military
leaders who argued that it was “essential” to have affirmative action in both the
military academies and the best schools’ ROTC programs so as to get a sufficient
number of well-educated minority officers in the military. Consolidated Brief of Lt.
Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. (Nos. 02-241, 02-516).
68. A number of Fortune 500 companies filed amicus briefs supporting the
University. See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses in
Support of Respondents (Nos. 02-241, 02-516); Brief of General Motors Corporation
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents (Nos. 02-241, 02-516); Brief of 3M, et al.
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516).
69. See, e.g., 123 S. Ct. at 2340 (“[T]he military cannot achieve an officer corps
that is both highly qualified and racially diverse unless the service academies and the
ROTC used limited race-conscious recruiting and admissions policies.”) (quoting
Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, et al. at 5 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516))
(emphasis in original); id. (“These benefits [of affirmative action] are not
theoretical, but real, as major businesses have made clear that the skills needed in
today’s increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to
widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”) (citing Brief of 3M, et al. as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516); Brief of
General Motors Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3-4
(Nos. 02-241, 02-516)).
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depend significantly on future Supreme Court appointments. Stay
tuned.

